Hey luke......
Any chance of me getting to see that tape?
(Fingers crossed
Thanx for your opinions, it's always good to get an insider's point of view.
Oh, and good to see ya made it here at last
Trample the wounded- hurdle the dead.
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| USAF CAS Deficiencies...... http://www.warthogterritory.net/forum/viewtopic.php?f=3&t=2414 |
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| Author: | M21 Sniper [ 09 Dec 2002, 16:42 ] |
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The Author of this article was nice enough to send copies to a lot of the WT crew, but i am sure not everyone has seen it. For the most part, i agree with his conclussions and analysis. The Close Air Support Imperative, Armed Forces Journal December 2002 CAS Failings in Afghanistan Highlight Deficiencies in Air Force Doctrine and Equipment Brig. Gen. David L. Grange, USA-Ret., Lt. Col. Walter Bjorneby, USAF-Ret., Capt. Kelly Sullivan, ANG, Lt. Mike Sparks, USAR and Chuck Myers As the U.S. military continues to transform itself into a truly integrated joint force that can operate against all adversaries, from armored forces to guerrilla bands, a critical requirement missing today, and into the future, is effective Close Air Support (CAS). There are severe deficiencies in the current aerial weapons platforms devoted to CAS, in the number of trained and equipped Forward Air Controllers (FACs), both ground and air, and in the training of CAS tactics, techniques and procedures. CAS has taken a back seat to precision-guided munitions and pre-planned aerial-delivered fires. Though precision fires are critical and offer dramatic improvements in destroying stationary targets, many fleeting mobile targets on the battleground still require immediate, suppressive and fixing fires, at times over large pieces of ground, brought in very close to maneuvering ground units. Cannon and machine gun fire, bombs under 500 pounds, and napalm are still viable supporting munitions for the advancing infantry soldier. Ground force leaders and air and ground controllers still must have the ability to call for, mark, direct and adjust CAS for maneuver forces that are searching for, encircling and destroying enemies and controlling key terrain. The ability to attain the synergistic effect of simultaneous fire from ground and air weapons is critical to combat operations. Trained observers on the ground and in the air must exist with the know-how to employ, in conjunction with ground assaults, Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps fixed-wing aircraft, along with Army lift and gunship helicopters and indirect mortar, artillery, and rocket-fire. Recent war games and combat operations in SouthWest Asia, such as Operation Anaconda, have demonstrated that our Armed Forces' ability to provide and employ effective CAS is waning. Robert's Ridge, Afghanistan Pinned down by enemy mortar fire with longer reach than the rifles and machine guns in their hands, the rescuers for Navy SEAL Neil Roberts are themselves in need of rescue. Rallying around a downed MH-47E Chinook helicopter, they have dead and some men who will be dead if they cannot secure the area for an evacuation helicopter to land. Finally after more than an hour's wait, F-15E Strike Eagles appear and have to be talked into doing gun strafing runs on the enemy's positions since they've never trained to do this CAS task. Nearly 15 hours later, the area is secure for extraction helicopters to land but not in time to save some men who died from their wounds and exposure. In retrospect, the Strike Eagle pilots never had an opportunity to practice and were using a relatively short range 20 mm Gatling gun at altitude and moving too fast (400 knots) to provide effective CAS. The F-15E was not meant for CAS. Its gun (M61) is an air-to-air back-up weapon. The Air Force tried to put a "happy face" on all this, but the fact remains that after building more than 700 heavily armored A-10 attack planes built specifically for CAS for Army maneuver units, only a small fraction are on active flying status today. When its troops needed the air strikes on Robert s Ridge, the Army had to wait and soldiers died needlessly. Some may counter argue that the F-15E is 300 knots faster (i.e., gets to the scene faster) and carries lots of bombs, but it also cannot loiter overhead pro-actively. And when it does arrive, it cannot fly slow enough to render effective CAS with gun strafing while the armored A-10 can fly low enough to be accurate. While F-15E are great strike aircraft, they are not designed or effectively equipped to support ground troops in close contact with the enemy. The A-10 is. The sad truth is that today, the U.S. military has no two-seat, manned, long-loiter-time, fixed-wing observation/attack aircraft as a result of the Congressionally-forced retirement of Army OV-1s and the self-inflicted retirement of Air Force/Marine Corps OV-10s. Unmanned aerial vehicles cannot really "see." While they can show a limited sensor view of the battleground, they lack the human eyes and mind that, from an aircraft, can investigate and comprehend the confusion that is a close combat fight. Even more troubling is that the Air Force has hundreds of A-10s in mothballs, some of which could be easily converted into two-seaters that could house an aerial observer to render the kind of alert air support ground combat units need, freeing the pilot to fly the aircraft. The current Air Force CAS state of affairs is unsatisfactory in light of the new geopolitical situation, in which asymmetric, primarily light infantry enemies seek to attack U.S. forces while hiding behind difficult terrain, vegetation and civilian populations. The U.S. military must regain "air observational superiority" by fielding a two-seat observation/attack aircraft to win the war on sub-national terrorism or else the bad guys will continue to get away. In future combat, alert, agile CAS, guided by Forward Air Controllers in the air and on the ground, can ensure that friendly troops are not killed by friendly fires. Over-reliance on precision-guided bombs without FAC help means that at least 10 percent of air-dropped ordnance will go out of control and could kill our troops. As was tragically discovered in Afghanistan, even when the weather permitted, CAS from above 15,000 feet can be as hazardous to friendly troops as to the enemy. THE PRECISION FIREPOWER MYTH The current media euphoria over near-precision munitions as a battlefield panacea hasn't factored in the many friendly deaths these bombs have inflicted on our soldiers. Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAMs) are not terminally guided but use GPS satellite-updated inertial guidance. Thus, they can and will go astray, killing our own troops if misused as CAS weapons, especially if the attack aircraft is physically not oriented to the target so as to not fly over the heads of friendly troops. As Rear Adm. Matthew G. Moffit, who is in charge of Navy aviation plans and requirements for air warfare, noted in the June 2002 National Defense magazine, Satellite-guided weapons -- like the Joint Direct Attack Munition -- dont require a picture of the target, just its geo-coordinates. But they are not ideally suited for time-critical strikes. The process of getting the GPS-guided bombs ready for firing takes longer than it would take for an aviator to spot a target with his sensor pod, beam a laser and release a laser-guided bomb. For pre-planned targets, GPS-guided weapons work very well, Moffit said. For the time-critical targets, we needed a weapon that we could actively place on the target in real time. The mechanics of employing JDAM cause delays, he said, because the pilot has to get the coordinates, make sure they are correct, input them in the system and finally release the weapon. "Its much easier to use laser-guided bombs, get eyes-on-target, track the target, [beam it with the] laser, drop the weapon. Terminally guided means that a FAC on the air or ground designates the target by illuminating it with a laser beam, and then the ordnance flies directly to that spot or the FAC directs the attack aircraft by radio to a safe line-of-sight attack path parallel (not perpendicular) to friendly troops. A First Sgt. in the 101st Air Assault Division wrote this of his combat experience in Afghanistan: "The problem with our mortars was there was a 24-hour CAS cap. And [attack aircraft] wouldn't fly near us if we were firing indirect, even though our max ordnant [how high mortar rounds arc into the sky] was far beneath their patterns. Something for you and your ALO [Air Liaison Officer] to work out. The other problem was the Air Force could never hit small groups of personnel. I watched and called corrections on numerous sorties and they could never hit the targets. Pay close attention to the direction of attack your ALO is bringing in the CAS. Every time it was perpendicular to us, we were hit with shrapnel. Not to mention the time they dropped a 2000-pound bomb in the middle of our company that didn't go off by a sheer miracle. Cobras [Marine Corps AH-1W helicopters] and 2.75 [rockets] shot at us also, and once again they were shooting perpendicular to our trace. Aviation provided the most near misses of all the things we did." Trying to steer bombs and missiles from a distant, offset location is problem-prone and gets worse the farther away you try to do it. Alleged "precision" munitions guidance has led to a lack of appreciation for CAS strikes being guided by a FAC on the ground using verbal directions via radio or a laser spot for terminal guidance -- so the attack aircraft is lined up on the target and there are fewer physical things that can go wrong. Munitions still bump into each other on release from the rack and fins get bent, for example. GPS-guided bombs can cause friendly fire casualties as a result of a number of factors: a defective guidance system or one damaged during transport or installation; incorrect GPS coordinates sent by the targeting system; incorrect GPS coordinates entered into the bomb; GPS signal interference from nearby mountains, buildings, or solar flares; or GPS signal jamming. POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS Present Air Force CAS doctrine and equipment is far from adequate and must be improved. While space constraints limit discussion of numerous specific solutions, a good first step would be to convert all OA-10A (A-10s that were redesignated as FAC aircraft) into two-seat OA-10B models to accommodate an observer in back to spot targets (aided by binoculars with an image-stabilization feature, which can distinguish buildings and vehicles from 20,000 feet.) A FAC career field should be established for non-rated officers instead of the grounded flyers who are now called ALOs and are unhappily filling a position in an ad hoc manner. It would include both the AFAC or Airborne Forward Air Controller, who would be the observer in the rear seat of an OA-10B, and the GFAC, the Ground Forward Air Controller on foot or in a vehicle and equipped with laser-ranging and -target designation systems and secure communications to connect with all "players" in the air and on the ground. Career FAC officers would all spend time as an AFAC; thus, they would "speak the same language" and have the perspective and confidence of the pilots to work together for terminal guidance. CAS is a demanding mission that takes proficiency from both the pilot and the FAC. Enlisted GFACs also would be trained as OA-10B AFAC observers, so they would have a perspective from the air, too. In fact, they should rotate tours of duty as GFACs and AFACs throughout their careers. This will also make this career field challenging and rewarding for all involved. An OA-10B could fly continuously over friendly ground maneuver troops. If targets emerged and Army units requested that they be struck, the OA-10B could immediately take care of small targets with its 30 mm cannon and twin underwing GAU-19/A .50-caliber Gatling gun pods and laser-guided Hydra-70mm rockets, with laser target marking done by GFACs. If additional firepower was required to suppress the target, the OA-10B could shoot smoke rockets to assist other fighter-bombers, such as F-15Es or single-seat A-10s on strip alert, in attacking the target with guns, rockets, and bombs. Air Force CAS is not a panacea for all Army ground maneuver firepower needs; the Army must have area-coverage types of fires, including smoke, scatterable mines, illumination rounds, and all-weather guaranteed fire support that only its own artillery and mortars can provide in a cost-efficient way. Making CAS all that it can be is only a part of the total joint transformation required. The return of AFACs and GFACs in a dedicated Air Force career field and a two-seat manned observation/attack aircraft is an urgent requirement that can be filled quickly at low cost to the taxpayer. Gen. Grange is Chief Operating Officer of the McCormick Tribune Foundation. Lt. Col. Bjorneby is a retired F-4 fighter-bomber pilot and consultant. Capt. Sullivan is an Air National Guard FAC and former F-15A and Army helicopter pilot. Lt. Sparks is an Army Reserve Infantry officer, former noncommissioned officer, and leader of the 1st Tactical Studies Group, a non-profit think-tank. Chuck Myers, a former WWII and Korean war attack pilot, is a defense consultant for AeroCounsel. Trample the wounded- hurdle the dead. |
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| Author: | M21 Sniper [ 09 Dec 2002, 16:45 ] |
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Damn, sorry Dice, didn't realize you had already posted this! Oh well, the more exposure the better i suppose. Trample the wounded- hurdle the dead. |
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| Author: | luke [ 23 Dec 2002, 08:13 ] |
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Hey!! I certainly do NOT agree with conclusions because they are based on only a couple of the actual FACTS of that situation. "Robert's Ridge, Afghanistan Pinned down by enemy mortar fire with longer reach than the rifles and machine guns in their hands, the rescuers for Navy SEAL Neil Roberts are themselves in need of rescue. Rallying around a downed MH-47E Chinook helicopter, they have dead and some men who will be dead if they cannot secure the area for an evacuation helicopter to land. Finally after more than an hour's wait, F-15E Strike Eagles appear and have to be talked into doing gun strafing runs on the enemy's positions since they've never trained to do this CAS task. Nearly 15 hours later, the area is secure for extraction helicopters to land but not in time to save some men who died from their wounds and exposure. In retrospect, the Strike Eagle pilots never had an opportunity to practice and were using a relatively short range 20 mm Gatling gun at altitude and moving too fast (400 knots) to provide effective CAS. The F-15E was not meant for CAS. Its gun (M61) is an air-to-air back-up weapon. The Air Force tried to put a "happy face" on all this" First of all, the article made a big point of saying more importance should be placed by the Air Force on CAS by placing more importance on the A10. I can agree with that. However, whining that it took over an hour to get CAS from strike eagles is just plain MISLEADING to the reader of the article. There WERE NO A10s used in the war at the time of that battle. In fact, the ONLY air force fighter taking part in the war at that time was the strike eagle. None of the others had the legs. There were aircraft carriers within reach but No navy F14Ds or F18s came in to help at all. The authors need to do less whining and quit leaving out the FACTS!!!! Next, they whine about how the F15E guys were so poor at CAS that they actually had to be talked onto their strafe runs. NO S___t !!!!!!! That is how a strafe run against an enemy position under cover is done!!!!! If those were A10s there then they too would have been talked onto their strafe run (by the USAF combat controller, tacP, etc.. by the way). I truly wonder if the authors of that article watched the predator and strike eagle footage from that battle. I have. I wonder if they heard the USAF PJs on the radio and the USAF combat controller. I have. The piss ass authors seem to forget that even if the air force had a million A10s that none of them would have been able to be used in that situation as there were not any suitable fields yet for the A10 to operate from. The air force CAS in that situation was FIRST RATE. The ground troops in that fight went in knowing that they had ZERO air cover. It was a risk they took. Did the authors realize that the F15E's started diverting from their intended targets before they were asked to by troops on the ground? They got information from their fighter data link about the situation and were already on their way... ...It is nothing short of dispicable the way that article belittles the efforts of several PJs, combat controllers and pilot/WSOs who found themselves in a tough situation and kicked ass and saved a bunch of lives. Then they absolutely ignore the wonderful job that A10s are doing over there right now. 'Happy face' my ass..... |
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| Author: | luke [ 23 Dec 2002, 08:16 ] |
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Oh yeah, those F15E guys did not just shoot their strafe runs "at altitude" as the article states. They came in pretty damn close over the ridge. I saw the tape when some strike eagle guys came through our base showing off their new FDL stuff. |
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| Author: | M21 Sniper [ 23 Dec 2002, 12:57 ] |
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Hey luke...... Any chance of me getting to see that tape? (Fingers crossed
Thanx for your opinions, it's always good to get an insider's point of view. Oh, and good to see ya made it here at last
Trample the wounded- hurdle the dead. |
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| Author: | luke [ 23 Dec 2002, 13:32 ] |
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I think I was lucky to see that tape. Those beagle guys happened to have an ENJJPT grad (ENJJPT is what our training program is called) and they decided to stop here on their way to Randolph. Not only did they have their own tapes but also that of the predator that watched Roberts being executed.....unfortunately it was not one of the armed predators..... |
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| Author: | M21 Sniper [ 23 Dec 2002, 17:38 ] |
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That sailor had a bad day. I wouldn't even want to see that tape bro. And yes, i agree, it's a shame there were no armed predators about, it would've saved the PO a lot of suffering. I can't imagine how frustrating it was to sit there seeing that, knowing you are helpless to stop it. Trample the wounded- hurdle the dead. |
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| Author: | JSF [ 23 Dec 2002, 22:59 ] |
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its bloody ridiculous indeed, indeed, indeed |
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| Author: | Larry Harris [ 12 Jan 2003, 14:03 ] |
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My first posting here, and you have a great site. I'm a TACP senior-NCO that led the conventional operations during Operation Anaconda. Every time I read that CAS was not effective is pure BS! The battalion commander I support loved CAS. It was his choice on how a target was serviced (CAS, mortars, or small arms fire). ALL AIRCRAFT the flew CAS was very, very responsive in killing those SOBs. As to aircraft being "talked" on to the target, duh, how else is it going to be done. Especially with troops in contact. I worked A-10, F-16, and F-15Es the flew VERY LOW and strafed. There is one F-15E aircrew the continued to strafe even though they were well below bingo. Keeping the enemy off our backs. My hats off to them and all the aircrews the flew CAS. Larry |
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| Author: | luke [ 13 Jan 2003, 09:50 ] |
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...when I went through SERE up at Fairchild AFB the summer of 2000 there were several tacp's. They were among the lowest ranking guys there (2-3 stripes) in a class full of lt's and capt's. However, they were the guys to go to for help and information. They knew their stuff and helped tremendously more than some 2 LT C9 medevac pilot to get us throught the resistance training camp (pronounced fake POW camp). Thanks for the good work over there.... |
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| Author: | M21 Sniper [ 13 Jan 2003, 19:25 ] |
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Your service is duly noted and appreciated bro. Trample the wounded- hurdle the dead. |
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