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November 2003
Close Air Support: More Improvement Is Needed
Military Services Score Some Successes, But Struggle with Fratricide and Interoperability
ARTHUR P. BRILL JR.
Sea Power Correspondent
On the road to Baghdad, U.S. forces moved so fast that tactical air often was the only source of fire support available to ground troops.
"I never failed to get Marine air when I called for it, and we often got air from the other services," said Maj. Gen. James N. Mattis, commander, 1st Marine Division. "When they heard the code word 'slingshot,' they knew a Marine unit was in trouble. A mechanized unit on Highway 1 called 'slingshot,' and they had air stacked up for 30 minutes. Marine, Navy, and Air Force air worked over the area and killed lots of bad folks."
The military's experience in Iraq underscores the importance of close air support (CAS), a delicate joint mission currently in transition and growing more important. It is a Pentagon priority because of the development of precision weapons, better procedures, and the U.S. military's challenges since 9/11.
Capt. Dan "Dix" Dixon, former head of the Top Gun school in Fallon, Nev., and now with the Naval Strike and Air Warfare Center at Fallon, said that when he was a young Navy pilot, 5 to 10 percent of total missions were for CAS. In Operation Iraqi Freedom, at least 75 percent of the Navy-Marine air involvement consisted of CAS missions, flown mostly by F/A-18 Hornets along with Marine AV-8B Harriers and AH-1W Cobra attack helicopters. About 50 percent of the bombs used were precision types, compared with less than 5 percent before 9/11.
In Iraq, U.S. forces fought together as never before, according to experts in the military services, who see that war as a prelude to future conflicts. Interservice cooperation on CAS began in the planning stages. U.S. ground troops relied on pilots from all services to destroy enemy targets, and few missions were more "joint" than CAS. Even Air Force B-52 bombers performed CAS missions in Iraq.
But many experts in the military and elsewhere in government believe that further improvement is needed in CAS interoperability and mission execution.
The U.S. flew about 41,400 air sorties in Iraq from March 19 to April 20, 2003, including 24,190 by the Air Force. Although the "friendly fire" incidents are still under investigation, it appears aircraft on target-of-opportunity missions caused them from the air, not CAS mission aircraft controlled from the ground. This is better, from a CAS standpoint, than what happened in the 2001 Afghanistan conflict, when fratricide accounted for almost a quarter of coalition members killed. But fratricide remains a top concern to U.S. commanders.
"There were too many 'blue on blue' incidents in Iraq and too many people were hurt," Vice Adm. Timothy J. Keating, commander, U.S. Fifth Fleet, said at a U.S. Naval Institute forum in September.
The CAS "friendly fire" got Congress' attention. Its auditing operation, the General Accounting Office (GAO), in May 2003 published a report, Lingering Training and Equipment Issues Hamper Air Support of Ground Forces, blasting the services for not being interoperable and offering constructive recommendations for change.
GAO concluded that the barriers to improved interoperability include limited opportunities for pilots to train together in a joint environment, and varied training standards among the services for personnel who coordinate close air support.
Although the Pentagon already was improving its joint CAS training and mission execution, the report is viewed as the driving force behind the current push for commonality.
"It's the standard we're aiming at. It's good that we talk to the other services because we learn from them," said Lt. Col. Lee F. "Tex" Schram, the Harrier coordinator at Marine headquarters. "It's not the Marine way, it's the joint way" that takes precedence.
That effort to improve joint performance started after Operation Desert Storm in 1991, when the Pentagon wanted a joint CAS capability. In 1995, Marine forward air controller instructors at the Navy's Expeditionary Warfare Training Group wrote the first joint "do's and don'ts" for CAS.
In 2000, the Marine Corps was named the lead agent to revise these, officially called joint tactics, techniques, and procedures. The first draft was written before the Twin Trade Towers fell, but joint issues often take time to develop. It took two and a half years and more than 3,000 comments before the publication was finally signed in August 2003.
"That's the primary CAS playbook for us and all the services. We use it here," said Dixon. His strike department at the Naval Strike and Air Warfare Center runs aircraft carrier air wings, each with 70 aircraft, through a four-week curriculum before they deploy. "It's definitely the way to go."
The proposed "do's and don'ts" were written into the air control order used in Iraq. Previously, pilots were cleared to fire only when they could see the target. Today's technology has created two other CAS controls: Ground forward air controllers no longer have to see U.S. aircraft, and pilots can be cleared to kill things on their own, provided the pilots are monitored to protect friendly troops.
Last year, the Pentagon shifted the responsibility for "joint CAS" to the U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFC) in Norfolk, Va.
JFC took over a management team that oversees an ambitious joint CAS action plan. It consists of the various services, special operations command, and representatives from the joint staff. "It's a collaborative effort," said Army Col. Peter T. Hayward, chief of the Department of Defense Requirements Division at JFC. "Everybody wants to do the right thing. Sometimes we have to discuss how we define 'right.' "
After the initial action plan was completed, there was some commonality among Navy and Marine CAS efforts, but the services generally had their own training standards, procedures, equipment, doctrine, and "mindset." Jointness was not a priority. Aircraft from different services had problems communicating with each other and with the ground. The fact that everyone did not follow the CAS "do's and don'ts" led to some disastrous "friendly fire" incidents, both during training and in Afghanistan.
While equipment issues may be easier for Joint Forces Command to solve than training, the services seem in general to be headed down the right road. The future should see more joint schools, training, and exercises along with better ground gear, radios, and ways to identify friendly forces and vehicles.
"We have emphasis and support from senior leaders that will help us improve joint CAS interoperability issues," said Air Force Col. Jimmy W. Ruth, command and control chief in the service's Battle Management Operations Division. "We're trying to move to a standard from a joint prospective and also within the Air Force."
Ruth said the Air Force has formed a "ground warrior team" to achieve commonality within its own service and shares its knowledge with the joint community. In addition to Fallon, joint training has begun at Nellis Air Force Base, Nev.; National Training Center, Fort Irwin, Calif.; and Marine Corps Air Station, Yuma, Ariz. "All four locations work in concert with each other," Ruth said.
"When it comes to CAS, the services have got to be on the same sheet of music," said Lt. Gen. Michael A. Hough, deputy commandant for marine aviation. U.S. aircraft in Afghanistan and Iraq mainly supported the troops around 15,000 feet, well above enemy missile threats. "The old days of Marine aircraft flying CAS missions 50 feet off the ground are over. An enemy with an eighth-grade education can blow you away from six to eight miles out. Standoff is key."
Ruth said, "Any attack platform capable of carrying a coordinate specific weapon can do the CAS role if they're trained and available. The Air Force is a strong proponent of the CAS mission area and the services are moving to a joint standard."
Examples of some exciting joint CAS developments include:
Joint tactical attack controllers: The joint battlefield needs more trained people to call in air attacks to take advantage of unexpected target opportunities. Both the Army and the Marine Corps will train non-aviator enlisted people. This is revolutionary. Up to now, the Army has relied completely on Air Force controllers, and the Marines use winged aviators. The Marines will start selecting people this year.
CAS simulators: Joint Forces Command is developing a comprehensive simulator system starting at the ground controller level. Controllers need to be trained and recertified using live aircraft, a big expense that can be lessened by using simulators. Prototypes are being tested. Eventually, realistic CAS simulation will be tied in with joint aircraft, vehicles, and command-and-control systems.
Increased Air Force and Army liaison: Unlike the Marine Corps, which owns its own aircraft and trains and fights as an air-ground team, the Army relies on a different service--the Air Force--and so finds CAS more difficult. But the two services are striving to work more closely together. The Air Force provides tactical air control parties for each Army maneuver force. The two services in June signed a high-level agreement spelling out a mutual exchange of joint CAS liaison teams at various command headquarters. An Army Battlefield Coordination Detachment consists of 60 soldiers, and the Air Force provides similar liaison teams.
"The liaison detachments were in Afghanistan and were enlarged in Iraq. Both services are pleased with the mutual support," said an Army official at the Pentagon. "The Army is a customer of joint CAS, and we support the movement to a joint standard."
Litening II precision targeting pod: In Iraq, the Marines had 76 jump-jet AV-8B Harriers, 60 based aboard amphibious ships. During the month of heaviest fighting, they flew 2,182 air-to-ground sorties. Equipped with the Litening II, the Harriers received excellent CAS grades for finding and killing difficult targets. Its advanced airborne laser can light up a target from 15 miles away. A Marine ground controller looking at the same target through goggles can confirm that it is the right target--a challenge central to CAS.
Live video transmission: Three Harriers were equipped in Iraq with experimental live video transmitters that enabled the ground controller to look at the same targeting pod picture the pilot was seeing in the air. Its potential for identifying correct targets and avoiding friendly fire is huge.
"Accurate target location is 90 percent of the battle in CAS," said Maj. Brian P. "Toaster" Annichiarico, a Harrier pilot and joint CAS action officer at Marine headquarters.
Target Location, Designation and Hand-Off System: Coming this year to selected Marine units, the man-portable device will enable a ground controller to laser an enemy target from at least 5 kilometers away and punch up coordinates in digital burst transmissions to an awaiting aircraft. After verifying the information with the ground, the pilot loads it into the digital weapon. The pilot may never directly see the target when the bomb is launched, and the ground controller may never see the airplane. Although the Marines and Air Force are working with different aircraft hardware systems, the software will make them interoperable by 2005.
"We'll tie in with the Marines," said Ruth. "Those CAS systems, along with the fielding of the Joint Tactical Radio System [in fiscal years 2006 and 2007] will be leaps and bounds over today."
In the services' progress toward commonality, there may still be battles over doctrine. For example, military experts complain that in Iraq, the Army and Marines had different fire support coordination lines.
Also, U.S. aircraft are getting so capable that U.S. commanders must rethink their tactics on the ground. "It is no longer how many aircraft it takes to take out one target, it is how many targets one aircraft can take out," said Keating.
Maj. Gen. James N. Mattis, the 1st Marine Division commander, had a regiment on Highway 7 going up to Baghdad with its right flank exposed to two enemy corps. On the way, he dropped off Marine reconnaissance units to call in air strikes in case the Iraqis moved against his advancing regiment.
"I was able to secure my right flank using the 3rd Marine Air Wing. We bypassed the enemy and cut them off," Mattis recalled. "Aviation is so capable now, it enables us to change our tactics. We're just coming to grips with that. The old force-density ratios (three troops on offense to one enemy on defense) no longer have to be obeyed."
Perhaps the proper view of CAS should be from the perspective of the troops fighting for the Taliban and Saddam Hussein, who saw up close how U.S. aircraft bolstered American troops on the ground. That support will only get better.
"There is no more worthy mission for an aircrew than protecting his 'buds' on the ground," said Dixon. *
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