<i>This is somebody else's take on it:</i>
F/A-22 IN COMBAT: During the final, gray days of December, while much of official Washington was away on vacation, the beleaguered leadership of the USAF fought a losing battle to defend their service’s future against budget-cutters in the OSD. Departing SECAF James Roche played little part in the deliberations, leaving Gen. John Jumper, Air Force chief of staff, in a severely weakened position. Jumper accepted the best deal he could get, with potentially grave consequences for his beloved service. The December battle ostensibly was about how many F/A-22 Raptor fighters the Air Force could buy, and how the DoD would absorb billions of dollars in last-minute budget cuts imposed by the White House’s OMB. But that was only part of the story, because the budget gap provided an excuse for senior political appointees around SECDEF Donald Rumsfeld to impose their will on the one service that had successfully resisted OSD’s priorities over the past four years. In other words, the struggle was as much about the meaning of military transformation as it was about money, with competing views of the future clashing over the fate of the Raptor. Gen. Jumper views the stealthy, twin-engine fighter as his service’s No. 1 transformation priority. Advisers to Rumsfeld question whether it is transformational at all, and have been trying for years to terminate the program at a fraction of the Air Force’s stated requirement. The requirement, for 381 planes, is driven by the need to equip each of 10 Air Expeditionary Forces with a squadron of 24 Raptors. That might sound like a requirement for 240 planes, but when standard Air Force methodology is applied for providing training, attrition, test and other back-up planes, the total works out to 381. The service at one time hoped to buy more, but it has consistently stated that 381 was the minimum number needed to sustain force rotations in future wars. Jumper and other Air Force leaders contend the Raptor is far superior to the single-engine F-35 JSF - more lethal, more survivable, more capable of sustaining high speeds for prolonged periods. They say it is the only suitable replacement for increasingly decrepit F-15 fighters, which exhibit numerous signs of age such as metal fatigue and rotting insulation on internal wiring. And they say that without the F/A-22, they cannot preserve global air superiority into the middle decades of the 21st century. OSD isn’t buying any of that. Senior political appointees, such as Stephen Cambone, undersecretary for intelligence, think the services are investing too much money in conventional weapons and not enough in the tools needed to fight unconventional adversaries. They view air superiority as an area in which the United States enjoys “excessive overmatch” - in other words, a war-fighting advantage so massive that it can safely absorb budget cuts to fund more pressing priorities. There are other areas where OSD and the Air Force don’t see eye-to-eye on future needs. For example, Gen. Jumper champions a multi-mission electronic aircraft designated E-10 as the successor to the E-3 AWACS and E-8 JSTARS, whereas Cambone favors using satellites or unmanned aircraft for future surveillance missions. But it is Raptor that has been the most persistent source of friction, with Cambone repeatedly trying to cut the fighter and the Air Force consistently resisting. Roche successfully rebuffed OSD’s efforts to impose its view of transformation on his service, blocking efforts to buy more B-2 bombers in 2001, threatening to resign over proposed F/A-22 cuts in 2002, and defending E-10 against proponents of SBR in 2003. But Roche’s resistance was bought at a price; the Air Force gradually lost supporters in OSD, while the Army’s and Navy’s willingness to embrace the official interpretation of transformation was warmly greeted. Roche’s departure under a cloud of procurement scandal thus leaves the Air Force in a very vulnerable position as bills for Iraq come due and the 2005 QDR approaches. With Air Force acquisition executive Marvin Sambur also planning to be gone in January and Pete Teets, Air Force undersecretary, expected to deplane in March, Jumper and his fellow generals are left with almost no political cover for their priorities within the Pentagon. OSD, of course, has its own problems. Cambone and Paul Wolfowitz, deputy defense secretary, who are leading the current campaign against Raptor, have both been discredited by events in Iraq. So has Mr. Rumsfeld. <b>In fact, Rumsfeld is so besieged that many insiders think he may leave shortly after delivering his budget testimony to Congress in March. That, presumably, would also be the end of the road for Cambone and Wolfowitz, which leads some observers to suspect that the F/A-22 fight is mainly about settling scores.</b> Since OSD’s plan does not contemplate cutting F/A-22 funding substantially until 2008, the Air Force could gamble that Raptor’s opponents will be long gone by then and Congress will restore lost funding. But Rumsfeld’s political demise has been prematurely reported several times in the past, so that can hardly be called a safe bet. It certainly isn’t a bet Jumper would comfortably make. Unfortunately, he may not have a choice. The cost of the Iraq war and the need to cut deficits has furnished the service’s critics with the perfect pretext for imposing their priorities. In a sense, the Air Force is just catching up with the Army and Navy, which have already seen their modernization plans decimated under Rumsfeld. But after dedicating his entire adult life to the Air Force, John Jumper can’t be very happy with his final holiday season on active duty. (Op-Ed by Loren Thompson, COO of the Lexington Institute, in Defense News)
<i>It's sad that it is even plausible that important decisions about the strength of our defense in the 21st century will be mainly about ego battles and turf wars.</i>
THE RAMPTOR ENGINEERING TEAM <img src=icon_smile_big.gif border=0 align=middle>
"Who cares if it works? Does it look good on the ramp?"
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