Dominant Logistics
The F/A-22 Raptor - What Transformation REALLY Is
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You can look long and hard and will likely never find another military reformer in favor of the F/A-22 Raptor program. I have supported this program from day one and would like to shed some light on the many facts about the program that have become buried in politics, propaganda, and outright lies. At the heart of this program is the reality of what true military transformation really should be, but whether your sources are the Pentagon, Air Force, and Lockheed, or Center for Defense Information, Project on Government Oversight, and CounterPunch, you won't find the facts anywhere.
Right or wrong, some people insist that we must have this plane while others insist that this program must be stopped. The time has come to set aside the propaganda and lies from both cases and look at what is really going on with this program, and where this program can take us. When you know the facts, it is easy to understand how important this program truely is.
Pro-Raptor Lies
Understand that the F/A-22 is not a true, revolutionary aircraft design. It is NOT all that and a bag of chips. It is an excellent plane, but its mere existence is not going to result in America automatically winning every war it chooses to fight. What the F/A-22 really is is the culmination of the lessons learned over many years of aerial combat.
The F/A-22 is not needed to counter enemy aerial threats in the form of new aircraft designs. Many studies have been promoted by the pro-Raptor crowd that attempt to justify the Raptor on the basis of new threat aircraft - all of these studies are complete nonsense. The number of nations that can afford to purchase and operate these ultra-high performance aircraft, like the Rafale, Eurofighter, and Su-35, can be counted on one hand, and all of them just so happen to be nations we are friendly with.
Also note that stealth technologies are not the revolutionary advance many within the Pentagon make them out to be. There are many means by which stealth can be countered effectively and not all of them are expensive. For example, effective tracking systems have been developed based upon radio and cellular phone signals that can track virtually any object moving through the air, no matter how stealthy. This is a marginal advantage at best. Nor is sensor fusion the magic many make it out to be. Being aware of the situation in which you currently lie is but a fraction of what is necessary to survive in any warfare scenario. It certainly isn't a bad thing to have, but increased awareness is no more of a panacea than stealth.
Promoting the F/A-22 on the basis of lies makes no sense. An honest evaluation of the Raptor can easily make the case to justify the plane but the programs backers have instead chosen the route of deception and deceit instead of emphasizing the role of the F/A-22 in real future warfare scenarios.
Anti-Raptor Lies
Unfortunately, those who oppose the program have taken the dishonesty factor to an entirely new level. From POGO, you can find the complete nonsense that the F/A-22 is supposedly intended to replace the F-16, a claim which has never been made anywhere other than at POGO. From there as well as other websites, you can hear about how the aircraft hasn't been sufficiently tested (when its really completed over 3000 hours of flight tests, nine times more than the combined flight test hours of the F-15 and F-16), is grossly over budget (when it is really about 10% over budget, which is less than the historical average for new military aviation programs), and isn't meeting performance requirements (even though the GAO reported in 2000 that the F/A-22 is meeting or exceeding EVERY key performance parameter defined in the program). There are plenty of legitimate concerns to raise about the F/A-22; why its critics insist on resorting to outright and blatant lies is a mystery.
Some of the criticism is certainly due to philosophical differences of opinion in what is required of modern combat aircraft. Some feel that a large Air Force fighter fleet is the best approach to defense while ignoring that with modern fighters, it is logistically impossible to sustain large fighter fleets, even for a nation like the United States. Others oppose the overall costs of the program and this is entirely understandable but it also ignores that most other options aren't much cheaper than the F/A-22 - South Korea just signed on to pay roughly $100 million per plane for their own F-15 program. Others just don't like the design because it was originally a Cold War era program but who cares what is was designed to do - isn't what it CAN do that really matters?
The Cost Issue
Let's start by settling the cost thing once and for all - this is one damned expensive bird, there is no arguing that point. But it has been from the day it was officially adopted back in 1991; it's expense was never hidden, contrary to the assertions of some. While the original designers back in the early 80s believed the future concept could be built on the cheap, the original F/A-22 budget was for over $99 billion for a total of 750 aircraft, or a unit program cost of $132 million per plane with a fly-away cost of $70 million per plane. And this was a best case scenario - this was long before the problems of advanced avionics, composite construction, and testing of this bird were ever even dreamed of. At that time, it was believed the aircraft would be ready to go in 1997 - seven years prior to its current expected service date. This was also before the testing program for the aircraft exploded to over 4300 hours of planned flight testing. Before anyone knew just how ugly things could get, they budgeted $132 million per plane.
Now then, most critics like to play a little game with the numbers here to show that the costs of the F/A-22 have "exploded", "spiralled out of control", "risen to obscene levels", etc., etc. use the phrase of your choice to paint the ugliest picture you can. The game is called slight of hand and essentially involves showing the reader what you want the reader to believe while conveniently making what you don't want the reader to know disappear.
In the case of the F/A-22, the game has been played by taking unrelated money values and directly comparing them as though they are somehow comparable. The best example is when critics start comparing unit program costs from original estimates and comparing them to current projected unit program costs - the comparison appears valid but ignores the fact that there is a substantial amount of cost that is fixed whether you are building two aircraft or 2000. By default the comparison implies a growth in costs whether one is actually present or not. This comparison also ignores the fact that buying in quantity will typically result in lower prices per unit.
As anyone who has ever shopped knows, to determine the value of two comparable products, you need to convert the prices to a common level (mathematically known as a common denominator) and then compare the prices. In the case of the F/A-22 Raptor program, this can be accomplished accurately in two ways, neither of which will ever be displayed publicly by the Raptor's critics as it goes entirely against their crusade. We start by accepting that the current F/A-22 budget, according to the GAO, will result in the Air Force receiving about 250 aircraft for a total budget of about $69 billion.
Our first option is to look at the original F/A-22 budget and determine how much of that budget would have paid for the development and testing of the aircraft and purchased the first 250 planes. To do this, we take the original budget of $99 billion, and subtract from it the 500 planes we aren't producing times the projected costs of each plane ($70 million). This leaves us with 250 aircraft that would've cost about $64 billion under the original budget. Given that our current budget is $69 billion for the same number of aircraft, the current price tag for the program is about 7.8% more than what was originally budgeted for the F/A-22. Keep this in mind.
The second method we can use is to evaluate the current program, based upon what we now know, and project what the program would cost if we were to produce the full 750 aircraft that were originally budgeted in the program. According to GAO estimates, if the current program were once again expanded to the original 750 aircraft, the per plane fly-away costs would be about $80 million. If we mulitply that by 500 aircraft and add it to our current program costs, we get a total of $109 billion for 750 F/A-22 Raptors, or about 10% more than the original projected budget.
In one of the more ironic displays of recent times, one Christopher Hellman of Center for Defense Information, testified before Congress regarding cost growth in tactical aviation programs. In his testimony, Hellman cites a study noting that in tactical aviation, cost growth of 10% annually were the norm throughout the Cold War. Hellman also makes the claim that DoD weapons programs routinely grow between 15 and 30 percent over the course of their development and procurement. And yet in this same testimony, Hellman is there to address the supposedly uncontrolled cost growth of the F/A-22, when its REAL cost growth is only 10%? Not only are the current costs of the F/A-22 program NOT unprecedented, they should've been expected given the historic norms of aviation procurement programs. Just because certain groups chose to fudge the books later on, including the Clinton administration, Congress, Lockheed, and the Pentagon, doesn't change the fact that from day one, anyone that CHOSE to know, knew that this program would end up costing about what it does today, if from no other source than historical precedent.
The reality is that the notion of cost overruns is a concept that plays with the public - it is something that the average person can look at and understand so critics of the F/A-22 ride that horse like there is no tomorrow. They give the reader the numbers they want the reader to know about and leave those dirty little facts hidden behind the corner because the facts don't support the crusade. This program is very expensive, but it always has been and it has not significantly increased in costs from the time it was first budgeted. You can play with the numbers to give an impression of rising costs, but accounting tricks are not necessarily reality - nobody EVER claimed this thing would be cheap.
Is It Worth the Price?
The real issue at hand is whether or not this thing is worth what it costs - and here again, the anti-Raptor crusaders want to tell you everything ACCEPT what you really need to know to make an accurate decision on this matter. But strikingly, the same can be said for the Raptors backers - they made a party line that everybody is sticking with, even though it is totally irrelevant and doesn't make their case.
Let's start with the mission obsolescence issue - that the F/A-22 was designed to take on advanced Soviet fighters that were never produced, and thus isn't needed. Instead of noting that this argument is entirely irrelevant, the Raptor backers stoop to claiming that somehow, the Eurofighter and Rafale are threats to America. Both statements are rooted in the pure fantasy that today, fighters engage other fighters, which virtually never happens. Today's aerial combat is about fighters against long range assets like the B-52, C-17, and E-3. For that matter, we should include the threat of highjacked airliners - long range assets are the only real aerial threat posed to America and our own long range assets are vulnerable as well. Small fighters like the F-16 and F-35 cannot defend the U.S. against long range assets, nor can they properly defend American long range assets abroad - they simply don't have the range, nor the payload capacity, nor the speed. The opposition for today's Air Force is not the Rafale or Eurofighter - it is the dozens of Mig-21s that even Third World nations can send up against a lone bomber or cargo aircraft, or the numerous cruise missiles that a single enemy bomber can launch against America. Neither the F-15 nor the F-16 is suited to these tasks and while the F/A-22 was never INTENDED for these tasks, its fundamental design characteristics make it well suited to these new roles.
Next up is the stealth matter, or more specifically whether or not this is a relevant technology. Raptor backers push this one hard knowing damned well this isn't a true stealth aircraft while the anti-Raptor crowd points out that stealth isn't all its cracked up to be anyways. Even though stealth is only a marginally useful technology, it is still of serious value in some critical applications. While it is true that ground-based systems can counter stealth, there are no airborne systems out there today or expected in the near future that can counter the technology. Where stealth is of value is against enemy fighters and radar-guided missiles from the air and the ground. Historically, the greatest threat to aircraft has been surface-to-air missiles and this is precisely where stealth can have positive effects - the ground station can track the aircraft but the missile itself cannot. Consequently, in today's air dominance mission (protecting long range assets and suppressing enemy air defenses), stealth is a useful and needed technology - no other roles realistically need the technology but the air dominance role does.
Another big dispute is over the capabilities of current aircraft, with the anti-Raptor crowd insisting that today's fighters are good enough while the pro-Raptor side says otherwise. While it's difficult to dispute that today's Air Force is amongst the finest in the world, it is equally clear that there are some serious problems on the whole. Over Kosovo, we never were able to adequately suppress air defenses, nor were we able to adequately take out aerial assets on the ground. In the first Gulf War, we were never able to get a handle on the Scud missiles, we simply couldn't cover enough ground and locate the targets even in the open desert. We're also hurting badly in our electronic warfare capabilities and many missions that used to be carried out by midsized aircraft like the F-111 and A-6 are now being carried out by heavy bombers because we lack aircraft with sufficient range and payload. In recent cases, B-52s have been used in Close Air Support roles because the lighter fighters simply can't handle the load and don't have the range.
If used properly (which is totally against current Air Force plans), the F/A-22 can address all of these needs and add a variety of new capabilities to the forces of the U.S. The Raptor has capabilities and potential that most people have no idea about - this debate has been so filled with lies and propaganda that even learned observers are no longer aware of what this plane really is and what it really brings to the combat table. While the F/A-22 is not a revolutionary aircraft, it can definitely transform the art of aerial warfare.
Payload Options
Many observers are so used to talking about the F/A-22 in its "clean" configuration that they don't even realize that the aircraft can carry weapons and sensors externally. In reality, the F/A-22 has payload options that rival the F-15E Strike Eagle in the quantity of ordnance it can deliver and vastly exceeds the capabilities of the F-15C or the F-16. The Raptor has two hardpoints under each wing; each hardpoint is rated at a capacity of 5000lbs. What this means is that in area strike roles (read "carpet bombing"), the "Air Superiority Only" F/A-22 can carry as many bombs as the F-15E. In the case of larger bombs for bunker busting, it likely can carry MORE than the Strike Eagle. And this is without even using its internal weapons bays. Coincidentally, it can also carry more air-to-air munitions than the F-15C, with twice the missile capacity of the current Eagles when external carriage is used. Stealth is an option for the Raptor - it can also make the choice of using massive amounts of firepower instead, an option not available with current fighter designs that are limited to a few bombs or a maximum of eight missiles. Many criticize that larger missiles cannot be carried by the Raptor because of its internal bays when in reality, the Raptor can carry larger and heavier missiles (and more of them) than the existing F-15s and F-16s.
While some point out that the F/A-22 lacks a true precision strike capability, the same can be said of all current U.S. fighter aircraft - we don't have a single fighter in the inventory with integrated precision strike capability, they all rely upon pods that are added to the aircraft like LANTIRN. There's no reason a similar approach cannot be used with the Raptor, for example we could integrate a LANTIRN type system in the doors of the main bomb bay to allow for use of the Maverick missile system. The Mavericks would be carried in the main bomb bay with a clean configuration for true precision strike. For heavier targets, there's no reason that the Maverick electronics couldn't be added to JDAM or JSOW. Fabricate an appropriate mount and the F/A-22 should be able to carry a single 2000lb Maverick-enabled JSOW internally for a capability equivalent to today's single carriage of the stand-off AGM-130 on the F-15E. With the Raptor's higher cruising speed, the JSOW would have a substantial increase in range in this configuration.
The ability to carry Sidewinder missiles in the side bays raises an obvious question - why not an enhanced version of the Sidearm or Rolling Airframe Missile, both of which are Sidewinder derivatives? The Sidearm is an anti-radiation missile while the RAM features both infrared and radio frequency homing modes. Again, the higher cruising speed of the F/A-22 enables these missiles to have much greater range in this application - where these missiles are unsuitable on the F-15 or F-16 for ground attack, on an F/A-22 in a clean configuration these missiles will increase in range by 50% or more making them much more useful than they currently are.
For that matter, the side bays could carry other options altogether. The missiles could be replaced by chaff and flare racks for SEAD missions, dramatically increasing the aircraft's capacity for these critical decoys. Another option is to install an electronic warfare package like jamming pods enabling the Raptor to function in the role of the now absent EF-111. Various cameras and radar systems for recon work are also options, converting the Raptor into a true tactical recon asset where it can supercruise over an enemy area and deliver the intel in real time through its onboard datalinking. Unlike UAVs, the Raptor can probe hostile areas and survive to get a more complete intel picture of enemy actions. In the main weapons bay, a similar approach can be taken to enable the F/A-22 to serve as a tactical version of the too-early-retired SR-71 Blackbird.
For improved SEAD capabilities, is there really any reason that the existing Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile could not be modified into a modern anti-radiation missile? It already homes in on radiation and some minor mods to the wings should allow at least two to fit internally in the F/A-22 at a much cheaper price tag than the ineffective HARM (of which the F-16J can only carry two). External carriage would also be an option so two Raptors would play cat-and-mouse in the SEAD mission, one clean and stealthy with the second loaded to the hilt with munitions and running the sensors.
Since we're modifying missiles, why can't the existing AMRAAM be used in a ground attack configuration? It has a respectable warhead and good range in addition to a semi-active guidance mode allowing for the fighter's radar to guide the missile to the target. There would be considerable merit to the idea of having the aircraft carrying six missiles that would be equally effective in both air-to-air and air-to-surface applications.
The availability of internal bays also makes other options easier, such as the deployment of future weaponry like laser cannons or directed energy weapons. These can be built in pods that will simply replace the bomb bay doors of the F/A-22 allowing for adding the weapon capability without a massive overhaul of the airframe, as would be required with an F-15 or F-16. Other options like fiber-optic guided bombs could be added in a similar fashion - simply design a module that will fit in the main bay of the Raptor and its a matter of plug-and-play for the entire F/A-22 fleet - you can't do this with existing fighters because external carriage requires extensive flight testing as the system disrupts the ability of the plane to fly, there are also weight and balance issues as external carriage puts the weight outside the aircraft centerline. New weapon designs can be brought together and fielded more quickly and cost effectively with the F/A-22 than with existing aircraft.
REAL Transformation
This is what transformation is all about - moving from a cookie-cutter Cold War force designed to engage the Soviets to systems that are as flexible and fluid as future battlefields will be. This is not about replacing the F-15C, the F/A-22 Raptor has so much more potential than that. Fielded and supported properly, this single plane design can:
Replace the F-15C in the air dominance mission and protect long-range assets abroad and defend the homeland against enemy long-range assets.
Replace the F-16J in the SEAD mission with a more survivable and capable aircraft that can defeat a much wider array of enemy capabilities.
Support or replace the F-15E in the heavy strike mission with an equivalent bomb payload.
Replace the F-117 in the precision, stealth strike role with a greater variety of munitions options.
Fill the gap left by the retirement of the EF-111 in the electronic warfare mission.
Supplement the U-2 and UAVs in the recon and data collection missions.
But it is equally important that we move beyond the notions of merely replacing existing fighter aircraft. The entire art of war is changing and it is critical that our concepts and designs change with the times. It is here where the Raptor can play out its most critical roles.
The F/A-22 in Future Wars
The benchmark for any program today is inevitably the war on terror - how can a given program improve our abbility to take out and prevent future terror attacks? Many view the F/A-22 as being obsolete because they see no way it can bring about success in this war but this is largely due to a collective failure of themselves and the Air Force to think outside of conventional norms. Viewed in an appropriate manner, the F/A-22 can be of its greatest value in fighting the war on terror.
If we expand it's operational abilities as has been defined, what we get is an entire fleet of aircraft that can rapidly transition between numerous roles. In locating and taking out terrorists, a variety of means must be employed. We currently use systems that intercept communications, systems that search areas with thermal and radar sensors, and still more systems to deploy weapons to kill the terrorists. The problem is that each of these capabilities exists in specific packages that only perform the specified task - satellites and specialty aircraft intercept the comms, other satellites, aircraft and UAVs perform the sensor sweeps, while fighters and bombers engage what we find.
The problem is that this requires us to forward deploy large quantities of diverse systems to track and kill terrorists, which is why we currently have a variety of forces scattered over more than a hundred other nations today. Where the F/A-22 can change everything is in its ability to merely swap out payloads to switch tasks and missions. Moreover, it can even perform multiple missions simultaneously because of its variety of payload options. Even in its "clean" configuration, the F/A-22 can carry sensors in its side bays and missiles and bombs in its main bay. Even if we were only to build 500 Raptors, this would enable us to forward deploy hundreds of Raptors to search out and kill terrorists. Unlike satellites, it can pop up anywhere at anytime, cruising at high speeds, to seek out and destroy targets of opportunity faster than those targets can escape. Instead of remaining the hunted, waiting for scraps of information and praying that intel can sort it all out before more Americans die or the terrorists merely slip away into the landscape, the F/A-22 can enable us to become the hunters, actively searching and destroying the terrorists abroad where they hide and prepare. On any given day, we could literally have 200-300 aircraft out there combing the globe with sensors compared to no more than a few dozen assets today. And each of these aircraft would also have the means to take out those targets it finds immediately, a capability none of our existing sensor platforms have.
But the war on terror is not the end-all, be-all of warfare either. Another example commonly brought up by F/A-22 detractors is the supposed inability of the Raptor to support ground operations like those ongoing in Afghanistan and Iraq. Here again, the problem is not lack of capability of the aircraft but lack of creative thinking on the part of the critics. Let's assume for a moment that some other programs come about including the Joint Tactical Radio System and the Small Diameter Bomb. The JTRS will allow those on the ground to communicate directly with those in the air. Currently, the F/A-22 is only expected to carry eight SDBs but this is in its clean configuration - there's no reason the Raptor could not carry eight bombs on each of two of its outboard hardpoints for 16 SDBs in total. This also keeps two hardpoints open for fuel tanks to extend its loitering time on location. What we're getting at here is replacing the traditional Combat Air Patrol with a flight of four F/A-22s forming a Combat Support Patrol. Side bays would house sensor mixes including thermal viewers, communication interceptors, chemical sniffers, ground search radar and the like with ground forces being able to directly tap into the information through JTRS. In our main weapons bays, mixes would include:
An air defense aircraft carrying a full load of six multi-mode AMRAAMs
A precision strike aircraft carrying two AMRAAMs and two Mavericks
A direct support aircraft carrying two AMRAAMs and two 500lb LGBs guided by ground forces
An area strike aircraft carrying two AMRAAMs and two 1000lb cluster munitions
What this mix gives the ground unit is a complete aerial support package that can provide comprehensive support while also maintaining control of the air. The Raptors serve as communications relays, recon platforms, and fire support platforms, all on a constant basis for the force on the ground. Where today's troops are forced to wait hours for support, a force with F/A-22 CSPs would have munitions on hand and ready to fire at all times. For the fans of Fourth Generation Warfare concepts, we're taking an OODA loop with a typical timespan of 30 minutes to 3 hours and slashing that to under ten or even five minutes. Instead of calling in and bombers being scrambled, the bombs are literally being targeted as the call for target verification is being processed. The munitions are already there and are sufficient to address just about any occasion that will occur in a typical low-intensity conflict.
Even in conventional warfare, the F/A-22 has a plethora of means to improve on our capabilities. As mentioned, the F/A-22 can carry the Small Diameter Bomb in large quantities and still have room for lots of other munitions as well. Conceivably, if external fuel tanks are not required, a Raptor could carry 16 SDBs along with 6 Maverick missiles externally along with two LGBs or cluster bombs internally - thats a serious weapons payload for anny aircraft. Taken to its logical extreme, as many as 40 SDBs could be delivered in a single Raptor sortie while retaining two AMRAAMs and two Sidewinders for self-defense along with it's 20mm cannon. The F/A-22 can play a vital role in virtually every phase of aerial combat.
Conclusions
This is not the V-22 Osprey or the RAH-66 Commanche, aircraft of designs that have consistently failed to live up to their requirements. The Raptor has met or exceeded all of its design parameters according to the 2000 report by the GAO. It's supercruise ability is rated 15% higher than spec, its acceleration is 14% higher, its manueverability is 4% higher, its combat radious is 23% higher, and its radar detection range is 17% higher. Its price tag, while high, is only 10% higher than initial projections and lower than the historical average for combat aviation. It isn't cheap, but it clearly meets what is REALLY needed in the future and can play a critical role in defending this nation and its interests abroad. THAT is why we should support this program.
This is not to say that the Raptor program is beyond fault or above legitimate criticisms. It could've been done cheaper and it could've been done quicker. Clearly, this program should've been developed over phases with some of the more advanced avionics brought in at a later date, perhaps in a "C" model. It should also have been designed to support bombs of up to 2000lbs in its main weapons bay. A FLIR would be nice but this was deleted early on for cost reasons.
But we should also note that the ideal companion aircraft for the F/A-22 is most definitely NOT the F-35 JSF. With as much functionality as is possible with this design, the need for an additional 1900 Air Force F-35s seems to be non-existent. The F-16 has been and remains arguably the finest all-around fighter in the world, certainly the best on a cost-to-performance measurement and the F/A-22 doesn't change that. Ideally, given the intensive investment already made in the F/A-22, we should complete the program and expand it back to 500 aircraft. Moreover, we should reinvest in the existing F-16 program by replacing current F-16s with new and improved models - Lockheed has many options that the Air Force can include in new F-16s. Even uprated F-16s would only cost about half the price of F-35s and this would allow us to forego the expensive development process. Much, if not most, of the F/A-22 program has already been paid for - yes, it's the most expensive fighter in the world but we've been making "lay-away" payments on it for more than 12 years and that's some real money that should not just be thrown out a window.
This isn't about replacing the F-15C or maintaining air dominance. The F/A-22 can fundamentally alter the way in which we engage in war and defend the nation. It can play a valuable role in winning the war on terror and meeting other defense requirements. Get beyond the hype and it is easy to understand why we REALLY need this aircraft in the force.
Heres the link to the entire site:
http://www.geocities.com/dominantlogistics/
Edited by - rickusn on Dec 02 2003 2:09 PM
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