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HISTORY of the USAF F–22 Raptor Acquisition
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DefenseWatch "The Voice of the Grunt"
06-16-2004

HISTORY of the USAF F–22 Raptor Acquisition A National Tragic-Comedy in 4 Acts



By Everest E. Riccioni



Comedic Acts — I Cost History, II The Justification Farce, III Operational Evaluation

Tragic Act — IV Our Acquisition System



The USAF, The Congress, the contractors, and their claques are trying desperately to justify the F-22 acquisition. This despite the fact that its reason for existence disappeared with the evaporation of the cold war, and a complete change in the possible inimical forces the US faces. The aircraft has been in a continual state of development for two decades — and unreasonable length of time — and has remained the alleged number one priority of the USAF.



The three comedies are the results of a.) the unabashed gross distortions of its cost, b. the continually changing rationalizations for the Raptor, and c. the fanciful claims for the battle capability of the aircraft.



Act I, The Cost History — During the initial advocacy for the F-22 Raptor it was claimed tha it would cost not 1$ more than the F-15, then well into its production cycle, i.e., $50 millions or $50M for 800 aircraft. The month the F-22 and F-23 prototypes flew the USAF claimed the cost of the program had risen from the claimed $40,000,000,000 ($40B) to $70B for 750 aircraft for a unit total cost of $93M — essentially double the original claim! At the first government check of the funding, the USAF claimed it could buy only 680 aircraft. At president Clinton’s request for clarification the USAF claimed it could purchase only 480 aircraft. On the formal Quadrennial Air Force review of its budget it claimed that it could purchase only 333 Raptors for a unit price to the taxpayer of $193M. General Jumper quoted the cost as $257M each for only 275 aircraft for a total expenditure of $70 billions. Will the cost increase ever end? This set of unconscionable cost distortions is ludicrous and the cost obscene, — Comedic Act I.



The second set of continual distortions are the constantly changing roles for the aircraft. During the Cold War it was reasonable to consider an advanced aircraft for air superiority, though its avowed role offensive counter-air operations deep in Russia, a fairly fanciful aspiration. To do this the aircraft was intended to possess unprecedented stealth, maneuverability and performance, with modern avionics for unprecedented situation awareness and weapon effectiveness. At the same cost as the F-15 that had none of these features — ludicrous. The dreamers put a unit flyaway cost ceiling of $35M (equals a total program cost of $50M), and a weight limit of 50,000 lbs. The result was an aircraft that cost 5 times as much and a weight increase of about 30 percent causing the performance to fall precipitously. Then United Socialist States of Russia fell apart without warning, taking the rationale justifying the F-22 with it. Of course, the program could not be cancelled for lack of need so the search for a mission was engaged. It became air superiority to control the air above our ground forces. But there was no air superiority threat facing our forces. One had to be conjured. We had sold high performance fighters to friendly nations and they could turn on us. So we needed the Raptor to defeat our high performance aircraft. Then Lockheed sought license to sell the Raptor overseas and received it. Now the USAF has created a never-ending arms race with ourselves! Added to this was the seeming need to make a ground attack fighter of the F-22, the F/A-22. But it carries half the bomb load of the F-117 — a battle tested aircraft 1/2 the cost of the Raptor. Then the dreams went to making it a fast, long-range strategic bomber, the F/B-22—even more irrational since its design for stealth is very unsuitable to such modification. There were many more modifications including that of interceptor for which it is particularly unsuited for reasons of slow launch, lack of numbers and low readiness rate.



Lost in all of this sea of irrationale is the nature of our current and future wars.



Our foreseeable enemies emanate from the Camel Countries with deserts stretching across North Africa through the Middle East, down the Persian Gulf, and into India and parts of China Our enemies are the fundamentalist Moslems schooled from childhood to hate Jews and the West and even non-fundamentalist Moslems. Religion is their license to kill all unbelievers. Their stated purpose is to collapse the non-Moslem world using terrorist and insurgent tactics, and ultimately to place them in a single caliphate. Their methods are subversion, destruction of critical facilities, and the spread of terror with surreptitious attacks and human bombers. And they are winning! And the war will be protracted. The insurgents are normally unidentifiable.



Important here, is that the F-22 can play no fruitful role in such combat. To believe otherwise is ludicrous — Comedic Act II.



The third comedic act results from the claims made of the operational superiority of the Raptor against (non existent) Camel Country fighter aircraft. Colonels, generals, and pilots are all claiming vastly superior capability based on scripted, specialized, jousting tests. This, before the operational tests were begun, and before they are complete! “It is declared better than a Hollywood death ray”, and (literally) “infinitely better than the F-15s and F-16s of which we have thousands.” To believe this, in light of past distortions, and to believe that a few F-22s can replace the now irrelevant air battle capability of our thousands of F-15s and F-16 is ludicrous — Comedic Act III.



Act IV, — the tragedy — is the eventual loss of more than $100B — an expenditure that has no rational combat purpose. This monetary loss comes in a war which is destined to cost more than $300B.



The greatest tragedies lie in all the “spin” and distortions used by the USAF to confuse The Congress, The Public, and even Itself to justify a mistaken acquisition. Lost is the great tradition of the USAF officer corps to be honorable, truthful, and to serve the Nation, not itself.



Guest Contributor Col. Everest E. Riccioni USAF (ret.) is a prominent military aviation engineer, consultant and author. He flew 55 military aircraft of all types for a total of 5,500 hours in the air during his 30-year career. He can be reached at ericcioni@earthlink.net

Everybody's a critic. Here's another project killer piece by Col. Riccioni. I don't know it he is sincere or not. The last one was on the V-22, I believe, and when I checked his facts it was apparent he was misinformed on several key items. I wonder if his rhetoric has changed since his "Fighter Mafia" days. If not, no wonder he made enemies back then. This is pretty harsh criticism, but he has always favored small, light dogfight fighters. Maybe he is running for Congress. I'll make a few comments.
First, it is useless to compare projected cost numbers from 1978 to current production figures. I know he is trying to spin the facts for a sticker shock effect. He should be comparing constant dollars (select any baseline year) for meaningful discussion. If you compare current F-16 production costs to projected values from 1975, I'm sure there would be a staggering "cost overrun". Ditto for the European types like the Gripen and Typhoon. Also, if you compare fly-away cost of new F-15's and F-22's, I think they would be favorable towards the F-22. The F-22 would be more costly (say 10-20%), but arguably worth it. The best criticism I can come up with of Col. Riccione's criticism is that he says nothing about the waste of 25-30 billion dollars that would happen if the F-22 was terminated. I think there is no escaping that would be a mistake. He is saying that we have done all the work to get an advanced capability over the F-15, but we shouldn't field it because it isn't needed yet. He also knows full well that if we start over it will cost much more to eventually field a system with the degraded capability he advocates.
Second, he says the aircraft has had constantly changing roles. He must be referring to that publicity stunt of renaming to the F/A-22. Yes, it is irritating to have to put up with these PR battles, but it is not a mortal sin. Even if the attack role for the F-22 is overstated, it is still an unmatched air superiority weapon (and always has been). And how can expoiting the potential of the F-22 in other military areas be such a negative? It is, after all, an effort to maximize the return on investment. Also, I respectfully disagree with his statement that the F-22 has no rational combat purpose. The time for his criticism of the design specifications is long past. We all know he likes lighweight fighters with consequent short range and light armament. Others made a stronger case for the features in the F-22. If it is overkill, then they did OK. If it was underkill, then I would be calling for cancellation. There are plenty of aircraft AAM and SAM systems that can challange the F-15 now. I don't know why he ignores this. Calling potential enemies degrading names like camel countries will not deter them from fielding lethal systems that they can buy off the shelf.
Thirdly, he mentions a weight limit of 50000 lbs and an increase of 30%. What the hey? This is another meaningless statistic. This is obviously not an empty weight he is quoting. It is also not a gross weight of any significance. What is it? Maybe a basic design weight (for up and away maneuvering). Like I said, meaningless.
I don't think he is informed about any details of the F-22 performance, and is just speculating (like in his V-22 piece). He is way off base saying the "performance has fallen off precipitously". And this statement: "Colonels, generals, and pilots are all claiming vastly superior capability based on scripted, specialized, jousting tests. This, before the operational tests were begun, and before they are complete!" shows his nasty side all too well. He has just accused many Air Force officers of malfeasance. Does he have any names to share, or is it the entire Air Force that is against him? He will never believe anything that he did not personally approve of is satisfactory. Anyone who disagrees with him is obviously involved in a conspiricy against the Republic. The USAF has been flying the F-22 since 1997. They know what its current capabilities are and also its future potential. So does the Congress. They like what they have seen demonstrated so far and are now in IOT&E with the intention of wringing out the last lingering problems, not to decide go-no-go. They will find some problems and we will fix them because the USAF deserves the best equipment possible. Col. Riccione is not in the loop. That is a good thing because he does not have the proper vision, IMHO.

THE CRAPTOR ENGINEERING TEAM <img src=icon_smile_big.gif border=0 align=middle>
"The F-22...It's the poo"

Edited by - a10stress on Jun 21 2004 1:10 PM

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I would buy the Raptor in numbers like the F-15E was procured; around 150 PMAI and six operational squadrons.

We need a next-generation air superiority fighter as an insurance policy down the road against countries in Asia that spend money on their AF and then get cocky.

At the same time I can't advocate buying hundreds upon hundreds of Raptors; no need at present. Three wings is good for now. And we can build more in the future if we need to.


Edited by - ViperTTB on Jun 21 2004 06:55 AM

I can't resist re-posting this soliloquy from two years ago.

<i>I guess I have revealed my own prejudices by criticizing others’. Perhaps I can make myself look a little less paranoid with the following satire that illustrates my point. With a little true facts, misinterpretation of those true facts and some made up statements that sound like they should be true, you can make a case against anything. I’ll try to write like a non technical reporter type so bear with the misuse of words and such.

Headline: Troubled A-10 Bomber has new setback

(Paris, France) The recent spectacular crash at the Paris Air Show is just another warning that this aircraft is fundamentally unsafe and has no place in a modern air force. In spite of the skill of one of the most experienced test pilots in the world, this plane belly flopped on the main Le Bourget runway and broke apart in a ball of flames. This is only the latest disaster to befall the A-10 program. In flight testing, firing the main cannon armament caused both engines to stall and the pilot was forced to eject. The test was investigating the dangerous condition that occurs when the gun is fired, aptly described as a “fireball” in front of the plane. Many airframe modifications have been tried to fix this problem, to no avail.
Criticisms of the aircraft date back to the start of the program when this so-called Close Air Support (or CAS) aircraft was pushed down the Air Force’s throat by some well connected bureaucrats led by Pierre Sprey, a defense systems analyst, and two Air Force mavericks Col. Boyd and Col. Riccioni. Despite the warnings from experienced pilots that flew this mission in several conflicts, the A-10 was specified to be a severely underpowered and slow death trap. If “Speed is Life”, as the pilots say, the A-10 is the Grim Reaper. Its specified top speed of 400 knots was slower than many WW II propeller planes. When flight testing revealed it could not even meet that meager speed, the requirement was steadily lowered to what it could do, currently a paltry 380 knots. This was the sad story of corruption throughout the development. Every time the specification could not be met, “adjustments” would be made. The empty weight was over 2000 lbs higher than promised, causing difficulty with every performance requirement. In combination with incompetent drag predictions and below spec engine thrust, this is a formula for a turkey, or a sitting duck. All the touted advantages for this plane are down the drain. Take off length prevents it from using the intended forward bases. Loiter time, a threshold requirement, is more than 12 minutes below spec. Bomb load is reduced. Maneuvering capability is crippled.
During tests of the lethality of the main gun armament against tanks it was determined that the jet’s stability was inadequate to take aim at the target without becoming a target itself. It is well known that a plane flown in the CAS environment should not fly on a constant trajectory for more than two seconds, lest it be shot down by radar guided ground fire. Using proposed “jinking” tactics the A-10 needs to confuse tracking, also confuses the jet’s ability to point the nose accurately. The A-10 needed more than six seconds to stabilize the side to side oscillations well enough to hit anything. The proponents say this will be fixed with an electronic box, just give them time (and money). We don’t need any more time. We need some one to make a decision to end this travesty.
Even the features advertised as giving the A-10 unprecedented survivability don’t work. In flight testing, switching into the so-called “manual reversion” flight control mode caused an out of control situation in which the aircraft pulled over 5 g’s (5 x the force of gravity) before the pilot regained control. Ground testing for fatigue uncovered a major design deficiency in a frame that supports the wing. This frame broke at 10% of one lifetime and is so buried in the fuselage it will be impossible to fix correctly. On top of that, it was determined that the flight profiles used by the engineers to estimate this fatigue life were woefully erroneous. This will require a wing redesign, another weight hit, and an expensive retrofit program. So much for the superior durability claim made by misguided proponents of this monstrosity. It’s time the congress did something to stop this wasteful spending on a useless, even dangerous, piece of hardware. An investigation should also be launched to determine who benefited from the obvious fraud with prosecution of the guilty following. (end of story)

How am I doing? I think I could write editorials for the New York Times.</i>


THE CRAPTOR ENGINEERING TEAM <img src=icon_smile_big.gif border=0 align=middle>
"The F-22...It's the poo"

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I should have considered the source before I got so long winded. I now see that Defense Watch is the Hackworth site. I'm thinkin' that Riccione was told by his editor to angle the story the way he did. Riccione is just a "journalist" now, taking care of business. I'm not saying I those are not the Colonel's real feelings, but it occurs to me I could make a good living as a "journalist" willing to bend to the editor's will a little. <img src=newicons/idea.gif border=0 align=middle> With minimal research I could write a negative article on any project out there, a hired gun. No, I'd feel like a crack ho'. Fuggetaboutit<img src=icon_smile_wink.gif border=0 align=middle>

THE CRAPTOR ENGINEERING TEAM <img src=icon_smile_big.gif border=0 align=middle>
"The F-22...It's the poo"

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well one thing is right, the A-10 IS in fact a "<i>Grim Reaper</i>"

The F-35 wont have any trouble easily waxxing anything the Soviets have in the works including the SU-30 series. The SU-30 series brings BIG firepower in misslery(but only 150rds in the gun), a LOT of fuel (needed due to soviet engine tech with regards to fuel efficiency) but only a 8-8.5G capability and a Vmax around M2.3 according to Sukhoi themselves. SU-30 is a good match for F-15E (not considering the all important avionics) but no competition to the F-35.

"We sleep safely in our beds because rough men stand ready in the night to visit violence on those who would harm us". George Orwell

Fighting For Justice With Brains Of Steel !
<img src="http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ac/atengun2X.GIF" border=0>

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The only time you have too much fuel is when you're on fire.

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Edited by - boomer on Jun 21 2004 4:34 PM

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The only time you have too much fuel is when you're on fire.

<BLOCKQUOTE id=quote><font size=1 face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica" id=quote>quote:<hr height=1 noshade id=quote>Or the USAF could just buy F-18E's to replace the Charlie Eagles, afterall they were good enough for the squids!) <hr height=1 noshade id=quote></BLOCKQUOTE id=quote></font id=quote><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica" size=2 id=quote>

No, that plane is not good enough for the squids, but neither was the F-4F in 1941...




Edited by - chadrewsky on Jun 21 2004 1:15 PM

<BLOCKQUOTE id=quote><font size=1 face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica" id=quote>quote:<hr height=1 noshade id=quote>
<BLOCKQUOTE id=quote><font size=1 face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica" id=quote>quote:<hr height=1 noshade id=quote>Or the USAF could just buy F-18E's to replace the Charlie Eagles, afterall they were good enough for the squids!) <hr height=1 noshade id=quote></BLOCKQUOTE id=quote></font id=quote><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica" size=2 id=quote>

No, that plane is not good enough for the squids, but neither was the F-4F in 1941...




Edited by - chadrewsky on Jun 21 2004 1:15 PM
<hr height=1 noshade id=quote></BLOCKQUOTE id=quote></font id=quote><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica" size=2 id=quote>Chad, your forgetting the F-4F Wildcats chief competitor, the vaunted F-2 Brewster Buffalo!!!

You look as lost as a bastard child on Fathers day.

_________________
\"One of you is gonna fall and die, and I'm not cleaning it up\"

Well...Yes, the F-4F was the best the Navy had in 1941...
The F-18E/F is not even the best jet on a flight deck with F-14D's IMHO.

But...that was not my point. In 1942 the USN developed tactics that enabled a plane like the F-4F, that was throughly outclassed by the Japanese Zero, to compete with, and eventually do well against it. The same thing can be done with the F-18E/F. So I wasn't really bashing the Hornet, just stating that its inherent advantages can be capitalized on, and its weaknesses diminished with the correct tactics.

<BLOCKQUOTE id=quote><font size=1 face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica" id=quote>quote:<hr height=1 noshade id=quote>
Well...Yes, the F-4F was the best the Navy had in 1941...
The F-18E/F is not even the best jet on a flight deck with F-14D's IMHO.

But...that was not my point. In 1942 the USN developed tactics that enabled a plane like the F-4F, that was throughly outclassed by the Japanese Zero, to compete with, and eventually do well against it. The same thing can be done with the F-18E/F. So I wasn't really bashing the Hornet, just stating that its inherent advantages can be capitalized on, and its weaknesses diminished with the correct tactics.


<hr height=1 noshade id=quote></BLOCKQUOTE id=quote></font id=quote><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica" size=2 id=quote>I know... I just wanted to trash the Buffalo and the tactics are going to be far more difficult to invent than the Thatch Weave was.

You look as lost as a bastard child on Fathers day.

_________________
\"One of you is gonna fall and die, and I'm not cleaning it up\"